What an Adversarial Example Is
In 2014, Szegedy and colleagues made an odd discovery: state-of-the-art image classifiers reliably misclassify inputs that are only slightly different from ones they classify correctly, differences small enough that a human looking at both images can’t tell them apart. Stranger still, the same crafted input often fools multiple different models, even ones with different architectures trained on different subsets of data. That transferability was the first clue that this wasn’t a quirk of one specific network, it was something more structural.
The initial guess was that extreme non-linearity in deep networks caused the blind spot. Goodfellow and colleagues argued the opposite the following year: modern networks are actually too linear in high-dimensional space, and that linearity is precisely what makes them predictably sensitive to small perturbations pushed in a consistent direction.
The Fast Gradient Sign Method
That insight led directly to FGSM, the Fast Gradient Sign Method, introduced by Goodfellow, Shlens, and Szegedy in 2014. It’s a single-step attack: take the gradient of the model’s loss with respect to the input, take the sign of each element, scale it by a small factor, and add that to the original input. One gradient computation is enough to reliably push an image across a decision boundary while keeping the change nearly invisible to a human. Kurakin and colleagues later measured this at scale on ImageNet, finding top-1 error rates around 63 to 69 percent for reasonably chosen perturbation sizes.
FGSM’s cheapness is also its limitation. It’s easy to defend against directly once a model has seen that kind of perturbation during training, which is part of why it became less an attack people worry about and more a building block, and a standard benchmark, for what came next.
Case: Stickers on a Stop Sign
The clearest demonstration that this isn’t confined to digital pixel manipulation came from Eykholt and colleagues in 2018. Their RP2 algorithm found a small set of black and white stickers that, placed in specific positions on a real, physical stop sign, caused a road-sign classifier to read it as a Speed Limit 45 sign, consistently, from a range of distances and viewing angles. This wasn’t a manipulated image file, it was a printed sticker on an actual sign photographed by an actual camera under actual lighting.
The result mattered directly for autonomous driving, where a sign classifier misreading a stop sign has obvious consequences. Follow-up work extended the same idea to object detectors like YOLO, trying to make the sign disappear from detection entirely rather than just get mislabeled, and other researchers found that some detectors resisted the original attack, which kicked off a genuine back and forth of attack and counter-attack papers that’s continued for years.
Projected Gradient Descent and Adversarial Training
Madry and colleagues formalized a much stronger, iterative version of the same idea in 2018: Projected Gradient Descent (PGD), which takes multiple small gradient steps instead of one, projecting back into the allowed perturbation region after each step. PGD quickly became the standard benchmark attack, strong enough that a defense which survives it is taken seriously, and one that doesn’t, generally isn’t.
The matching defense, adversarial training, bakes PGD directly into the training loop: at every step, generate a PGD-perturbed version of each training example and train the model on that instead of the clean input, framed formally as a min-max optimization problem. Athalye and colleagues later broke most of the defenses submitted to a major 2018 robustness competition using stronger attack variants within weeks of the review cycle ending. PGD adversarial training was one of the few that held up, and it largely still does.
The Attack-Defense Cycle
That pattern, a defense proposed, then broken within months by a slightly stronger attack, repeated often enough that it became something researchers explicitly study as a cycle rather than a series of one-off events. PGD adversarial training surviving this long is the exception, not the norm.
It comes at a real cost, though. Training against PGD-generated examples at every step multiplies training time, since each step now runs an inner optimization loop of its own. More importantly, models trained this way tend to lose accuracy on ordinary, unperturbed inputs, a robustness-accuracy tradeoff that’s been measured repeatedly and that researchers are still actively trying to narrow rather than eliminate.
Case: Jailbreaking Language Models with GCG
The same underlying idea shows up again, a decade later, in a very different kind of model. Zou and colleagues introduced the Greedy Coordinate Gradient (GCG) attack in 2023: an automated search for a short suffix of otherwise meaningless tokens that, appended to a harmful request, reliably pushes an aligned language model into starting its response with something like «Sure, here’s how to» instead of refusing.
The property that made FGSM interesting shows up here too. A suffix optimized against one open-weight model frequently transfers to other models the attacker never had direct gradient access to, including closed commercial systems. Follow-up work built generative models that can produce large numbers of these successful suffixes in seconds rather than requiring a fresh optimization run each time, pushing attack success rates on some tested open models close to 100 percent. Separate mechanistic research found these suffixes work by hijacking the model’s internal attention, dominating how it contextualizes the rest of the prompt in the moment right before it starts generating a response.
Conclusion
From a stop sign with stickers on it to a string of gibberish tokens appended to a chatbot prompt, the same fact keeps resurfacing: a model trained to minimize error over a data distribution doesn’t automatically learn a decision boundary that lines up with human intuition about which inputs count as «similar.» Anyone with gradient access, or in some cases just enough queries and compute, can find the specific direction where that mismatch is largest and push an input across it. Every generation of models so far, image classifiers, object detectors, aligned language models, has shipped with some version of this blind spot, and every defense proposed against it has bought time rather than closed the gap for good.
By: Max Johnson B.